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Abstract: Mongolia located between Russia and China has been the object of close 
attention not only for its geographic neighbors, but also for non-regional states called 
as “third neighbor”. That’s why Mongolian foreign policy has traditionally been an 
important part of its development strategy. One of the main roles in the process of 
determining Mongolia’s foreign policy strategy belongs to the President. Democratic 
Party candidate Kh. Battulga won at the Presidential elections in 2017. All his steps 
in the field of foreign policy can be divided into three main areas. Firstly, the President 
of Mongolia has established himself as a supporter of improving relations with 
Russia, primarily through intensifying trade and economic cooperation and active 
personal diplomacy towards the Russian side. Secondly, Kh. Battulga demonstrated 
diplomacy in the Chinese direction though he had difficult time to build cooperation 
with the southern neighbor of Mongolia due to his election campaign criticizing 
China... Thirdly, Kh. Battulga made some changes in the strategy of relations with 
the “third neighbor”. For example, he rejected an active participation in some global 
international events and stayed indifferent to the idea of “permanent neutrality” of 
Mongolia. Perhaps the most serious foreign policy initiative of the new President 
of Mongolia was the idea of joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a 
permanent member. This idea has caused serious political discussions in the country, 
dividing the expert network into supporters and opponents of the President’s initiative. 
However, despite certain changes in Mongolia’s foreign policy under the President 
Battulga, it is difficult to state a radical turn in the foreign policy strategy. Due to 
political and legal reasons, as well as the external conditions of social and economic 
development of Mongolia, the President is not able to change the main foundations and 
principles of foreign policy of the state formed in the post-socialist period. Meanwhile 
it could be admitted that in Mongolia’s foreign policy the rationality based on the 
ideological solidarity (“commonwealth of democracies”) is gradually giving way to the 
rationality of a geographical contiguity and economic pragmatism.
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Mongolia, located between Russia 
and China, has been traditionally 
considered as a geopolitically significant 
state. During almost the entire XX 
century the “Russia-Mongolia-
China triangle” has been the core of 
international relations in the region2. 
For a long time, the fate of Mongolian 
statehood has depended on the nature of 
relations with the two great neighbors. 
Russian Empire / USSR has traditionally 
acted as the main ally and defender of 
the sovereignty and independence of 
Mongolia while China posed a threat to 
the security and independent existence 
of the Mongolian state. Until 1946, the 
Republic of China refused to recognize 
the independence of the Mongolian 
People’s Republic, considering it as a part 
of its territory. Only under direct pressure 
from the Soviet leadership, Chiang Kai-
shek was forced to make concessions 
on this issue, establishing diplomatic 
relations with the MPR. During the 
aggravation of relations between the 
USSR and the PRC, Ulaanbaatar 
relied on a comprehensive alliance 
with Moscow, fearing the revisionist 
sentiments of Mao Zedong, who stayed 
skeptical about Mongol sovereignty.
After the collapse of the USSR, the 
geopolitical balance of power in the region 
changed radically. Ulaanbaatar normalized 
relations with Beijing, and established 
close ties with Western countries and its 
Asian allies (primarily with Japan and 
the Republic of Korea) which provided 
Mongolia with the opportunity to choose 
a new foreign policy strategy, based on the 
principle of “multi-pillar” (Mong. “олон 
тулгуурт”) one. Not wishing to be bound 
by allied obligations with any great power, 
Mongolia relied on partnerships and 
balanced relations with the main players 
- Russia and China as its geographical 
neighbors, as well as a group of non-
regional countries (USA, EU, Japan, 
Republic of Korea, India, Turkey), called 
as the “third neighbor” (Mong. “гуравдагч 
хөрш”).3 As a result, a competitive 
environment arose around Mongolia, 
expressed in the rivalry of the great powers 
for influence in the region and access to 
the country’s large mineral deposits. In this 
regard, the question of the foreign policy 
preferences of the Mongolian ruling elite 
has become one of the main agendas of the 
political process in the country.
Introduction
The Role of the Presidency in Mongolia’s Foreign Policy
23Despite the fact that the most 
influential authority in Mongolia belongs 
to the parliament, the presidency plays 
a prominent role in the state political 
system, especially in the field of foreign 
2 See, Zheleznyakov A.S. Russia in the Mongolian Triangle // Political Journal. 2004. No. 8. P. 42-44; Luzyanin S.G. 
Russia, Mongolia, China in the first half of the twentieth century. Moscow: Publishing house of the Institute of the Far 
East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2003. Pp.320
3 Concept of Mongolian Foreign Policy https://www.legalinfo.mn/annex/details/3362?lawid=6340 (Accessed September 
30, 2020)
policy. According to the Constitution of 
Mongolia, the president represents the 
country in relations with foreign states 
and, in agreement with the parliament, 
concludes international treaties, appoints 
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and recalls the heads of Mongolian 
embassies in foreign countries, is the 
commander-in-chief of the country’s 
armed forces, heads the National Security 
Council (Article 33)4.
A significant example of an active 
foreign policy position is the activities of 
Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj, who had served 
as President of Mongolia for two terms 
(2009-2017). In particular, in 2012, with 
the active participation of the Mongolian 
president, the country joined the OSCE5 
and joined the NATO Individual 
Partnership Program6. On the initiative 
of Ts. Elbegdorj in Ulaanbaatar, starting 
from 2014, the international conference 
“Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Security in 
Northeast Asia” is hold on a regular 
basis7. Finally, the head of the Mongolian 
state succeeded in establishing a trilateral 
format of negotiations between the heads 
of Russia, Mongolia and China on the 
development of economic corridors8. As 
a result, the President Ts.Elbegdorj was 
steadily associated with an active foreign 
policy of Mongolia.
Foreign Policy Aspects of Battulga’s Election Campaign
45678In July 2017, Khaltmaagiin Battulga9 
won the presidential elections and 
became the head of state until at least 
2021. According to a widespread 
opinion, the foreign policy attitudes and 
preferences of Kh. Battulga, declared 
during the election campaign, were one 
of the factors of his final victory. First of 
all, it is worth noting that considerable 
emphasis was placed on criticizing 
Mongolia’s contemporary relationship 
with China. On the one hand, in recent 
years, the PRC has been Mongolia’s 
key foreign economic partner, ranking 
first in the country’s trade turnover and 
in foreign investment10. Thousands of 
4 Constitution of Mongolia http://worldconstitutions.ru/?p=33 (Accessed September 30, 2020) 
5 Mongolia joined the OSCE http://ru.rfi.fr/v-m ire/20121121-mongoliya-vstupila-v-obse (Accessed September 30, 
2020)
6 NATO and Mongolia agree program of cooperation https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_85430.htm. (Accessed 
September 30, 2020) 
7 Ulaanbaatar Dialogue https://www.un.int/mongolia/mongolia/ulaanbaatar-dialogue (Accessed September 30, 2020)
8 Meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping and President of Mongolia Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj http://en.kremlin.ru/
events/president/news/52211 (Accessed September 30, 2020) 
9 Results of the second round of voting in the 2017 Presidential Election of Mongolia http://gec.gov.mn/
details/2188(Accessed September 30, 2020) 
10 Foreign Trade http://www.1212.mn/stat.aspx?LIST_ID=976_L14# (Accessed September 30, 2020)
11 Terentyev V.I. Images of China and Chinese in the national consciousness of Mongols // Bulletin of the Tomsk State 
University. 2016. No. 406. P. 152-157.
Mongolian citizens annually visit China 
for trade, educational, medical and other 
purposes. Ulaanbaatar and Beijing have 
established a comprehensive strategic 
partnership. On the other hand, both 
for historical reasons and because of 
current circumstances, the Mongols 
are extremely wary of their southern 
neighbor, fearing, above all, one-sided 
economic dependence and ethnocultural 
assimilation11. So, the fears of the 
Mongols in relation to China and the 
Chinese were actively exploited by Kh. 
Battulga’s supporters during the election 
campaign.
Firstly, even a few years before 
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his nomination for the presidency of 
Mongolia, Kh. Battulga criticized the 
project to build a railway from the 
country’s large mineral deposits to the 
border with China on a narrow-gauge 
standard. In his opinion, this might 
lead to deepening the raw material 
dependence of the Mongolian economy 
on its southern neighbor and negatively 
affect national security12. Secondly, the 
campaign “accused” the main opponent, 
the Mongolian People’s Party candidate 
M. Enkhbold, of his sympathy for China 
and his Chinese ancestry13.
In addition to the image of an anti-
Chinese politician, Kh. Battulga is 
remembered as the friendliest to Russia 
candidate. Although all of the candidates 
declared the need for maintaining and 
developing friendship with the northern 
neighbor, it was Kh. Battulga who more 
actively exploited the positive image of 
Russia among the Mongolian population. 
According to opinion polls by the “Sant 
Maral” Foundation, Russia is by far the 
leader among the countries named as the 
most desirable external partner. So, in 
12 Geopolitics https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cqXGQ4uCT28(Accessed September 30, 2020)
13 The reason for Kh. Battulga's victory and M.Enkhbold's defeat https://www.24tsag.mn/a/152935 (Accessed September 
30, 2020) 
14 Sant Maral Foundation Politbarometer https://www.santmaral.org/publications(Accessed September 30, 2020)
15 Khaltmaa Battulga: "Mongolia Supports the Results of the Referendum in Crimea." http://www.unuudur.
com/?p=28322 (Accessed September 30, 2020) 
16 Democratic Party candidate Kh. Battulga's action plan http://gec.gov.mn/details/2137 (Accessed September 30, 2020)
2016 and 2017 to the question “Which 
country is the best partner for Mongolia?” 
Russia was named by 61.1% and 66.6%, 
respectively. By comparison, China got 
1.6% and 0.6%, the US 6.8% and 6.5%, 
Japan 6.3% and 7.3%, respectively14.
The image of Kh. Battulga as a “pro-
Russian politician” was formed several 
years before the election campaign. He 
was among those Mongolian politicians 
who openly supported the reunification 
of Crimea with Russia in the spring of 
201415. An important part of his election 
program was the thesis of increasing 
trade and economic ties with Russia as a 
condition for strengthening the country’s 
national security16. The “Ardchilal” 
Democratic Party newspaper published 
a close-up photo of Kh. Battulga and 
Vladimir Putin. Both presidents share 
common interests in doing judo which 
is quite symbolic. In addition, there are 
some other important features that mark 
Kh. Battulga as a pro-Russian politician, 
among which are his knowledge of the 
Russian language and rumors about his 
wife whose origin is Russian.
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President Kh. Battulga started his first 
steps in the international arena with an 
ambitious initiative to intensify trade and 
economic relations with Russia. In August 
2017, during the opening ceremony 
of the World Judo Championship in 
Budapest, for the first time as President 
of Mongolia, he met with V. Putin 
and announced his participation in the 
upcoming in September 2017 “Eastern 
Economic Forum” in Vladivostok17. 
During this Forum, Kh. Battulga proposed 
a project for transporting Mongolian 
coal to South Korea and Japan through 
the Far Eastern seaports of Russia, and 
also expressed his hope for signing a free 
trade agreement between Mongolia and 
the Eurasian Economic Union18. In June 
2018 in Ulaanbaatar with the support 
of the Mongolian President, a series 
of events titled “Mongolian-Russian 
Initiative-2018” was held to strengthen 
trade and investment cooperation between 
the two countries. In addition, the task of 
Mongolia’s construction of a hydroelectric 
power station on the cross-boundary 
Selenga River and its tributaries which in 
recent years has been a stumbling block 
in Russian-Mongolian relations was 
actually removed from the current agenda. 
These actions of the Mongolian President 
confirmed many observers in their opinion 
17 Vladimir Putin met with President of Mongolia Khaltmaagiin Battulga http://news.mongolnow.com/29_08_a01.html 
(Accessed March 28, 2020)
18 Vostochny port in Primorye is already ready to receive Mongolian coal ITAR-TASS, 09/05/2017. http://tass.ru/
transport/4532128 (Accessed September 30, 2020)
19 See, Rodionov V.A. The Dalai Lama XIV Factor in Contemporary Mongolian-Chinese Relationship // Vlast. 2017. 
No. 9. P. 153-157.
20 Kh. Battulga: I am not anti-Chinese. But… http://itoim.mn/index.php/site/news/10541 (Accessed September 30, 
2020)
of Kh. Battulga’s intentions to pursue a 
foreign policy course, largely oriented 
towards the cooperation with Russia.
Relations with the PRC looked 
different in the first months of Kh. 
Battulga’s presidency. The image of a 
politician with anti-Chinese rhetoric 
clearly prevented the Mongolian 
President from establishing working 
contact with his Chinese partners. 
Moreover, shortly after taking office, 
Kh. Battulga in one of his interviews 
harshly criticized the position of the 
ruling Mongolian People’s Party, whose 
government, under the pressure from 
the Chinese side, refused to accept the 
XIV Dalai Lama in Mongolia in the 
future19. In particular, he stated that 
“the issue of the Dalai Lama’s visits to 
Mongolia is the exclusive prerogative 
of the Mongolian side, and the Chinese 
side should not try to put pressure on 
Ulaanbaatar”20. Only a year later, in 
early June 2018, within the framework 
of the SCO summit in Qingdao, the first 
meeting of Kh. Battulga and Chinese 
President Xi Jinping took place, at which 
the parties discussed the prospects for 
the development of trilateral economic 
corridors between Russia, Mongolia 
and China. Kh. Battulga’s official visit 
to China in April 2019, during which a 
Relations with Russia and China
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number of important bilateral agreements 
were signed21, finally dispelled doubts of 
skeptics about the importance of relations 
with Beijing for the Mongolian president. 
The PRC’s role as one of the key partners 
for Mongolia was confirmed by the short-
term visit of the Mongolian President to 
China in February 2020 at the height of 
the COVID-19 pandemic. During this 
visit, Kh. Battulga expressed support for 
the Chinese people in difficult times and 
announced the provision of 30,000 sheep 
to China as aid from Mongolia22.
It is worth noting that Kh. Battulga’s 
diplomacy in the Chinese direction 
21 Documents signed during the state visit of president Battulga to China https://president.mn/en/2019/04/26/documents-
signed-during-the-state-visit-of-president-battulga-to-china/ (Accessed September 30, 2020) 
22 China Focus: Xi says China, Mongolia help each other in face of difficulties http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-
02/27/c_138824927.htm (Accessed September 30, 2020)
23 Gazprom and Mongolia to create a joint venture to develop a feasibility study for the construction of a gas pipeline to 
China https://tass.ru/ekonomika/9282045 (Accessed September 30, 2020) 
is developing, first of all, within the 
framework of a trilateral format, i.e. 
Mongolia’s cooperation with Russia and 
China in the SCO, in the “Economic 
Corridors” project, which includes 
Mongolia’s long-standing dream of 
becoming a transit country for Russian 
gas to China23.
In general, the geography of foreign 
visits and international meetings of the 
Mongolian head indicates the priority 
of relations with the closest neighbors - 
Russia and China.
Table. Kh. Battulga’s meetings with leaders of foreign states













Lee Nak Yeon (Ulaanbaatar)
Xi Jinping and Vladimir 
Putin (Bishkek)
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In addition to relations with 
geographical neighbors, the expert 
community is no less attentively 
following the new president’s approach 
to the strategy of the “third neighbor”. 
In this regard, Kh. Battulga cannot avoid 
comparisons with his predecessor in 
this post, Ts. Elbegdorj, who earned the 
reputation of a pro-Western politician.
On the one hand, Kh. Battulga 
continued the general foreign policy 
strategy for developing the “third 
neighbor” policy. In late July 2019, he 
paid an official visit to the United States, 
during which the Mongolian-American 
Declaration on Strategic Partnership 
was signed24. As a result, the United 
States became the fifth country (after 
Russia, Japan, China and India) with 
which Mongolia has established strategic 
partnership relations. He also paid a visit 
to India (called Mongolia’s “spiritual 
neighbor”) in September 2019 and had 
a meeting in Ulaanbaatar with the Prime 
Minister of the Republic of Korea Lee 
Nak Yeon.
On the other hand, a number of steps 
taken by Kh. Battulga in the international 
area demonstrate a departure from Ts. 
Elbegdorj’s policy towards the “third 
neighbor”. A striking feature of the first 
two years of Kh. Battulga’s presidency 
was his refusal to be engaged in the work 
of global international organizations. He 
ignored the regular meeting of the World 
Economic Forum in Davos in 2018, 
which was regularly visited by former 
24 MEDIA NOTE: Declaration on the Strategic Partnership between the United States of America and Mongolia https://
mn.usembassy.gov/strategic-partnership-declaration-us-mongolia/(Accessed September 30, 2020) 
25 V.V. Samoilenko. Neutrality: an urgent need or a rudiment of the past? https://mgimo.ru/about/news/experts/
neytralitet-aktualnaya-potrebnost-ili-rudiment-proshlogo/ (Accessed September 30, 2020) 
president Ts. Elbegdorj. Also, the present 
Mongolian President did not attend the 
plenary meeting of the UN General 
Assembly 72nd session. Though Kh. 
Battulga explained his non-involvement 
in these events due to the country’s 
domestic issues, it can be regarded as 
shifting away from the strategy of former 
president Ts. Elbegdorj, who used the 
platforms of these global organizations 
for positioning Mongolia as a liberal 
democratic country.
Another deviation from Ts. 
Elbegdorj’s line was actual closing 
down the work for promoting the Law 
on granting Mongolia the status of 
permanent neutrality. The draft of this 
law, developed at the initiative of Ts. 
Elbegdorj, assumed that Mongolia would 
be given the official status of a neutral 
country that did not enter any military-
political alliances and organizations. 
This bill caused a mixed reaction from 
Russia and China. In particular, the 
former Russian ambassador to Mongolia 
V.V. Samoilenko, in his article on this 
topic, questioned the adoption of such 
a law: “What has changed in the world 
and in the region and has cast doubt 
on the strategic stability provided by 
the integration processes in Asia that 
are favorable for Mongolia? What new 
threats and challenges did Ulaanbaatar 
see, who do they want to ensure the 
neutrality between?”25.
The initiative that was not formally 
related to foreign policy was the idea 
Third Neighbor Policy
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of  Kh.Battulga to return death penalty 
in Criminal code, abolished in due 
time on the initiative of Ts. Elbegdorj. 
The abolition of this punishment 
was considered as one of the main 
achievements by the former president 
and was positively noted in the West, 
which sees this step as an important 
attribute of the democratic development 
of Mongolia. In this regard, the idea of 
Kh. Battulga was considered by Western 
organizations and experts as a departure 
from democratic values. Thus, the 
international human rights organization 
Amnesty International, in its report on the 
situation of citizens’ rights in Mongolia 
in 2017, specifically noted the draft law 
on restoring the death penalty law in the 
country as a negative aspect26.
An even more resonant event in 
the internal policy of Mongolia, which 
received a certain response abroad, 
was the amendments proposed by 
Kh.Battulga to the laws regulating the 
legal status of judges, the prosecutor 
general and the head of the anti-
corruption agency. A number of Western 
media outlets described these steps by 
the Mongolian president as an offensive 
of authoritarianism and a step away 
from the values of democracy, hinting 
at the possible deterioration of relations 
between Ulaanbaatar and the “third 
neighbor”27.
On the whole, the first years of 
Kh. Battulga’s presidency were not the 
most effective in terms of developing 
relationships between Mongolia and 
the “third neighbor” and its positioning 
as “the only democracy in the region,” 
which Ts. Elbegdorj was so concerned 
about.
SCO Initiative
2627Perhaps the most notable event that 
can become a serious turn in Mongolia’s 
foreign policy is Kh. Battulga’s initiative 
on the country’s possible entry into 
the SCO. Since 2004 Mongolia has 
had the status of an observer in this 
organization. Russia and China, as the 
structure-forming members of the SCO, 
traditionally advocate granting permanent 
membership to Mongolia. However, in 
Mongolia itself, for many years, the issue 
26 Report: Mongolia 2017/2018 https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/mongolia/report-mongolia/ 
(Accessed September 30, 2020) 
27 See, Here’s how democracy is eroding in Mongolia https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/03/heres-
how-democracy-is-eroding-mongolia/?fbclid=IwAR1SSi1_4pOT50rTPUSPU-br7jOJ_8bLb8QEynLpY6jaNw4-
unXl5gH5Chg&utm_term=.416cce8fc850 (Accessed September 30, 2020) ; Genghis Khan's Biggest Fan Is 
Testing Mongolia's Democracy https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-04-16/genghis-khan-s-biggest-
fan-is-testing-mongolia-s-democracy?utm_source=google&utm_medium=bd&utm_campaign=Pol&cmpId=GP.Pol 
(Accessed September 30, 2020) 
of the prospects of changing this status 
to the status of a full-fledged member 
has been the subject of public debate. 
For example, President Ts. Elbegdorj 
repeatedly stressed the need for Mongolia 
to maintain its observer status in the 
SCO. Against this background, the phrase 
uttered by Kh. Battulga in May 2018 at 
the Mongolian Economic Forum about 
“the expediency of raising the status of 
Mongolia in the SCO” sounded like a 
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bolt from the blue and provoked another 
wave of disputes28. Some representatives 
of the Mongolian expert community 
note that this initiative by Kh. Battulga 
may negatively affect the policy of the 
“third neighbor”, while others supported 
the President’s idea29. The reaction 
of the Western expert community 
representatives is indicative in this 
regard. Some of them directly expressed 
their skepticism on the issue, referring 
to the “authoritarian nature” of the SCO, 
membership in which is not advisable 
for Mongolia as “the only democratic 
country in the region”30.
Thus, the above-described allows 
concluding that President Kh. Battulga is 
quite clearly trying to move away from 
the foreign policy line of his predecessor 
in this post and to outline new priorities. 
Drivers of Change in Mongolia Foreign Policy 
282930Can some of the adjustments in 
Mongolia’s foreign policy be explained 
solely by personal preferences of the 
present Mongolian President? Obviously, 
one cannot deny the fact that President 
Kh. Battulga sympathizes with Russia 
and repeatedly noted his respect for the 
Russian President. It is also evident that 
he, unlike Ts. Elbegdorj, is less affiliated 
with Western liberal institutions, and 
rather tends to more conservative views. 
However, the ongoing changes are hardly 
due to this circumstance alone.
World politics has been characterized 
by an increase in the level of 
confrontation between the great powers 
in recent years. The core of the new 
conflict is the relationship between 
the United States (more broadly, the 
collective West), the Russian Federation 
and the PRC. All these centers of 
power traditionally play a key role in 
Mongolia’s multi-pillar foreign policy. 
Until recently, Ulaanbaatar has managed 
to successfully maneuver between its 
28 President Kh.Battulga participated in the discussion “SCO Perspectives: Mongolia's Participation” http://montsame.
mn/read/91208 (Accessed September 30, 2020) 
29 It is right and wrong for Mongolia to join the SCO http://dardas.mn/news/pview/774 (Accessed September 30, 2020)
30 Jargalsaikhan M., Dierkes D. Mongolia doesn’t need to join the SCO http://blogs.ubc.ca/mongolia/2018/mongolia-
sco-qingdao-membership/ (Accessed September 30, 2020)
northern, southern and “third” neighbors. 
However, current trends are narrowing 
the field for Mongolia’s foreign policy 
maneuver, forcing it to re-prioritize. 
For a number of objective reasons, 
most of Mongolia’s trade and economic 
ties fall on Russia and China. Most of 
Mongolia’s large economic projects (gas 
transit pipeline, economic corridors, 
construction of new railways) are 
linked to Russia and China. Against this 
background, the role of other countries 
looks much more modest.
Speaking of the “third neighbor” role 
in Mongolia’s foreign policy strategy, it 
should be noted that this is, first of all, 
an ideological structure, which is based 
on the principle of “common liberal 
democratic values” of the Western 
world and Mongolia. Committing to 
this principle since the early 1990s 
specifically guaranteed Ulaanbaatar grant 
and soft loans from the “third neighbor”. 
In other words, the stake on active 
cooperation with the “third neighbor” was 
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also Mongolia’s economically motivated 
choice. Meanwhile, the trends of recent 
years show a gradual decline in the role 
of shared values  as a factor in economic 
development. Moreover, the principle of 
ideological solidarity is getting replaced 
by pragmatics and a new version of “real 
politik”. And Mongolia does not stay 
away from these trends. In Mongolia’s 
foreign policy, rationality based on 
ideological solidarity (“commonwealth 
of democracies”) is gradually giving way 
to the rationality of geographic proximity 
and economic pragmatism. And this, 
in turn, cannot but affect the role of the 
“third neighbor” in Mongolia’s foreign 
policy.
Of course, one should not forget 
that Mongolia remains a parliamentary 
republic, where the main role is assigned 
to the legislative branch of government 
and the government accountable to it. 
Accordingly, the head of the Mongolian 
state is very limited in his powers to 
implement foreign economic tasks 
on which the fundamental interests 
of the country are based. In addition, 
many foreign policy initiatives by 
Kh. Battulga may crash against the 
opposition parliament and government 
members. The final decision on the issue 
of Mongolia’s accession to this or that 
international organization (for example, 
the SCO) remains the prerogative of the 
parliament. However, the trends that have 
emerged in recent years may receive their 
further development, and the ideas of 
the priority in relations with Russia and 
China may become more popular with the 
Mongolian political elite.
